

Curriculum Vitae

Employment

2018– Faculty Lecturer, Critical Writing Program, University of Pennsylvania

Research

AOS Philosophy of Psychology; Philosophy of Science

AOC Philosophy of Mind; History of Psychology; Early Modern Philosophy

Education

2012–18 **PhD in Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania**

Dissertation: *Actually Embodied Emotions*

Committee: Gary Hatfield (advisor), Karen Detlefsen, Lisa Miracchi,
& Michael Weisberg

2013–15 **Certificate in Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience, University of Pennsylvania**

Supervisor: Martha Farah

2010–12 **Master of Philosophy in Cognitive Science, Macquarie University**

Dissertation: *Emotions across Three Phases: A theory of a dynamic emotion system*

Committee: John Sutton (advisor) & Nicolas Bullot

2004–08 **BA with First Class Honours in Philosophy, Australian Catholic University**

Publications

- (6) Hopkins, E. J., Weisberg, D. S., & Taylor, J. C. V. (2019). "Does expertise moderate the seductive allure of reductive explanations?" *Acta Psychologica*, 198.
- (5) Weisberg, D. S., Hopkins, E. J., & Taylor, J. C. V. (2018). "People's explanatory preferences for scientific phenomena." *Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications* 3(44): 1–14.
- (4) Hopkins, E. J., Weisberg, D. S., & Taylor, J. C. V. (2016). "Examining the specificity of the seductive allure effect." In A. Papafragou, D. Grodner, D. Mirman, & J. C. Trueswell (Eds.), *Proceedings of the 38th Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society* (pp. 1829-1834). Philadelphia, PA: Cognitive Science Society.
- (3) Hopkins, E. J., Weisberg, D. S., & Taylor, J. C. V. (2016). "The seductive allure is a reductive allure: People prefer scientific explanations that contain logically irrelevant reductive information." *Cognition*, 155, 67-76.

- (2) Weisberg, D. S., Taylor, J. C. V., & Hopkins, E. J. (2015). "Deconstructing the seductive allure of neuroscience explanations." *Judgment and Decision Making*, 10(5), 429-441.
- (1) Taylor, J. C. V. (2013). "Emotional Sensations and the Moral Imagination in Malebranche." In *The Discourse of Sensibility: The Knowing Body in the Enlightenment*, ed. H. M. Lloyd. Cham: Springer.

Articles under review

- (1) Taylor, J. C. V. "Solipsistic sentience and affective perception." Manuscript submitted for publication.

Work in preparation

- (3) Taylor, J. C. V. "Affect and perceptual objects."
- (2) Taylor, J. C. V. "Emotional primitivism."
- (1) Taylor, J. C. V. "What is a Jamesian emotion?"

Book reviews

- (4) Taylor, J. C. V. (2017). "Review of *The Passions of the Soul and Other Late Philosophical Writings* by R. Descartes, trans. M. Moriarty." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 2017, 25(6): 1242–1244.
- (3) Taylor, J. C. V. (2013). "Review of *Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. M. Pickavé & L. Shapiro." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 21(6): 1235–1237.
- (2) Taylor, J. C. V. (2012). "Review of *Occasionalism: Causation Among the Cartesians* by S. Nadler." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 20(3): 627–630.
- (1) Taylor, J. C. V. (2011). "Review of *The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge*, ed. C. Wolfe & O. Gal." *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 19(6): 1225–1227.

Presentations

(† indicates invited)

- (12) "What is a Jamesian emotion?"
 Oral presentation, *International Society for Research on Emotion (ISRE)*, St. Louis, MO. (July, 2017)
 Poster presentation, *Society for Affective Science (SAS)*, Boston, MA. (April, 2017)
- (11) "Emotional primitivism and appraisal theory" †
 Oral presentation, *Representing Reality: A daylong conference on the philosophy*

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- of psychology, State University of New York at Potsdam. (May, 2017)
- (10) “On ‘Seductive Allure of Neuroscience’” †
 Oral presentation, *Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience Retreat 2017*, University of Pennsylvania. (February, 2017)
 - (9) “Actually embodied emotions”
 Poster presentation, *42nd Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SPP)*, The University of Texas at Austin. (June, 2016)
 - (8) “Does expertise moderate the seductive allure of reductive explanations?”
 Oral presentation, *42nd Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SPP)*, The University of Texas at Austin. (With E. J. Hopkins & D. S. Weisberg, June, 2016)
 - (7) “Descartes on the heart, blood, and Harvey”
 Oral presentation, *International Society for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology (ISHPSSB)*, Université de Québec à Montréal. (July, 2015)
 - (6) “Injecting concepts into Burgean perception”
 Poster presentation, *40th Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SPP)*, University of British Columbia. (June, 2014)
 Oral presentation, *2014 Penn Spring Philosophy of Science Workshop*, University of Pennsylvania. (May, 2014)
 - (5) “On experiencing and categorising one’s own emotion states” †
 Oral presentation, *Faculty of Human Sciences Higher Degree Research Showcase*, Macquarie University. (November, 2014)
 - (4) “Carruthers on pretence, emotions, and reading one’s own mind: An exploration”
 Oral presentation, *Agent Tracking 2011: A Multidisciplinary Conference on Identification and Tracking of Human Individuals*, Macquarie University. (June, 2011)
 - (3) “A cognitive model of the imagination and emotions”
 Oral presentation, *15th Annual Meeting for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC)*, Kyoto University. (June, 2011)
 - (2) “Emotional affect and the moral imagination in Malebranche”
 Oral presentation, *Inaugural Conference of the Centre for the History of Philosophy: Emotions in the History of Philosophy*, University of York. (May, 2011)
 Oral presentation, *ACU Philosophy Seminar Series*, Australian Catholic University. (April, 2011)
 - (1) “Sensations, emotions, and imagination in Malebranche: Interdependency of mind and body”
 Oral presentation, *Sensibilité: The Knowing Body in the Enlightenment*, special stream of *Australian Society for Continental Philosophy Conference (ASCP)*, Uni-

versity of Queensland. (December, 2010)

Grants & honors

- 2017–18 Critical Writing Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania
- 2015–16 Nancy L. Blank Graduate Prize Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania
- 2014–15 George W. M. Bacon Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania
- 2012–17 Benjamin Franklin Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania
- 2013–14 Visiting Associate, Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University
- 2010–12 Australian Postgraduate Award, Macquarie University
- 2011 Faculty of Human Sciences Higher Degree Research Excellence Award, Macquarie University
- 2005 Canon Australia Scholarship for Excellence in Japanese Studies, Australian Catholic University
- 2013–17 Travel Award x 4, University of Pennsylvania
- 2011 Travel Award, White Rose Centre for the History of Philosophy (CHiPhi)
- 2010–11 Travel Award x 3, Macquarie University

Services to the profession

- 2018– Senior tutor at the Marks Family Writing Center, University of Pennsylvania
- 2014–16 Graduate Associate and student advisor at Harrison House, University of Pennsylvania
- 2013–16 Volunteer research assistant in the Cognition & Development Lab, part of the Institute for Research in Cognitive Science (IRCS), University of Pennsylvania
- 2011 Co-convenor and head of graduate committee of *Agent Tracking 2011: A Multidisciplinary Conference on the Identification and Tracking of Human Individuals*, Macquarie University
- 2017– Reviewer for *Acta Psychologica*; *Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Science*; *Emotion Review*

Courses taught (as primary instructor)

University of Pennsylvania

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| (11–12) | The Mind of a Dog | Fall, 2019–Spring, 2020 |
| (7–10) | The Art of Persuasion | Fall, 2018–Spring, 2020 |
| (5–6) | The Origins of Consciousness | Fall, 2018–Spring, 2019 |

(3–4)	Music and the Brain	Fall, 2017–Spring, 2018
(2)	Introduction to Philosophy	Summer, 2017
(1)	Cognition & Emotion	Spring, 2017

Courses taught (as teaching assistant)

University of Pennsylvania

(13)	Early Modern Philosophy Instructor: Karen Detlefsen	Spring, 2015
(12)	Biomedical Ethics Instructor: Andrew McAninch	Fall, 2014
(11)	Visual Studies: Eye, Mind and Image Instructors: Michael Leja & Gary Hatfield	Spring, 2014
(10)	Introduction to Philosophy Instructors: Gresham Riley & Pamela Riley	Fall, 2013

University of Notre Dame, Australia

(9)	Introduction to Philosophy and Ethics Instructors: Patrick Yong & Sandra Lynch	Semester one, 2012
(8)	Introduction to Philosophy Instructor: Patrick Yong	Semester two, 2011
(7)	Introduction to Ethics Instructor: Patrick Yong	Semester one, 2011

Australian Catholic University

(5–6)	Theories of Human Nature Instructor: Stephen Buckle	Semester one, 2009 & 2012
(4)	Theories of Human Nature Instructor: John Quilter	Semester one, 2011
(3)	Professional Ethics Instructor: Drago Heler	Semester two, 2010

Macquarie University

(2)	Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics Instructors: Robert Sinnerbrink, Cynthia Townley, & Jeanette Kennett	Semester two, 2010
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Hijiyama University

(1)	Various courses in developmental and professional English	2005–2006
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Graduate coursework**(† indicates audited)****Philosophy of Emotion**

Emotion, Motivation, and Control †	Lisa Miracchi
Contemporary Ethics: Contempt, Shame, and Disgust	Adrienne Martin

Philosophy of Mind & Psychology

Mind in Life: Evolution and Perception	Gary Hatfield
Philosophy of Psychology	Gary Hatfield
Epistemic Realisms	Gary Hatfield
Philosophical Issues in Cognitive Science (Macquarie University)	John Sutton

Cognitive Science & Neuroscience

Proseminar in Psychology: Cognitive Neuroscience	Russell Epstein
Foundations of Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience	Martha Farah
Special Topics in Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience	Martha Farah
Issues in Brain Imaging (Macquarie University)	Mark Williams
Concepts & Object Recognition	Gary Hatfield
Cognitive Neuroscience	Matthew Weber

History of Philosophy

From Natural Philosophy to Modern Medicine	Karen Detlefsen
Critique of Pure Reason †	Rolf Horstmann
17 th Century Philosophy	Karen Detlefsen
Hellenistic Philosophy	Susan Suavé Meyer
History of Analytic Philosophy	Elisabeth Camp

Other philosophy courses

Philosophy of Physics	Zoltan Domotor
Formal Logic	Scott Weinstein
Metaethical Rationalism	Errol Lord

References

Gary Hatfield	Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania	hatfield@sas.upenn.edu
Karen Detlefsen	Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania	detlefse@sas.upenn.edu
Lisa Miracchi	Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania	miracchi@sas.upenn.edu
Michael Weisberg	Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania	weisberg@sas.upenn.edu
Deena Weisberg	Psychology, Villanova University	deena.weisberg@villanova.edu
Martha Farah	Center for Neuroscience & Society, University of Pennsylvania	mfarah@upenn.edu

Dissertation synopsis: *Actually Embodied Emotions*

Emotions are familiar features of our lives. But despite our intimate relationship with them, we struggle to understand exactly what they are. In 1884, William James famously asks: “What is an emotion?”—a simple question, but a tricky one. Philosophy and the sciences of the mind have not yet agreed on its answer.

This dissertation explores the nature of emotion in human and non-human minds. It offers a *primitivist theory of emotion*: prototypically, an emotion is a bodily feeling caused by *interoceptive* monitoring of activity in sensory systems (*exteroceptors*) during registration of the organism’s environment. An emotion is a specific kind of affective state whose intentional quality is directed at both the organism and its sensible environment.

The primitivist theory is Jamesian in spirit. In attempting to answer his own question, James proposed that emotions are bodily feelings. He also placed an embodied *feeling self* at the center of his theory. Emotions, as dynamic, ever-present feelings of the body, construct this feeling self. In building on these concepts, the primitivist theory stands as a plausible answer to James’s question.

While most extant theories of emotion are *cognitivist* in nature, the primitivist theory is *non-cognitivist*. Emotions need not be triggered by prior mental states; they can occur prior to any rich perceptual or cognitive processing. We can thus attribute them to a wide range of creatures, from cognitively sophisticated humans to organisms possessing rudimentary sensorimotor systems.

Actually Embodied Emotions has five chapters. Chapter 1 is an historical project: it examines James’s theory of emotion within the context of his broader theory of psychology. It also assesses contemporary treatments of James. Two common misreadings lead commentators to either reject his theory or read it in a presentist manner, teasing out of it concepts developed in twentieth-century cognitive psychology. In analyzing these mistreatments, chapter 1 presents Jamesian theory as a conceptual resource for contemporary emotion researchers.

Chapter 2 examines attempts to revive and revise the Jamesian approach in light of scientific progresses. While such revivals should be celebrated, they also should respect James’s theoretical commitments. These “neo-Jamesian” theories neglects James’s noncognitivism. However, a legitimate neo-Jamesian theory can account for emotions triggered independently of prior mental states.

Chapter 3 details the aforementioned primitivist theory of emotion. It draws from recent findings and theories throughout philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and biology. It argues that emotional experiences contribute to perception. Perceptual contents involve *affordances*: we perceive objects via what we can do with or to them. Emotional feelings partly constitute affordances in representing the needs, concerns, and capabilities of the organism with respect to exteroceptive stimuli. An emotion thereby imports a self-interested affective quality to a perceptual state.

Chapter 4 focuses on human emotion episodes. It describes how we come to label our emotion episodes, and how they are influenced by social and cognitive factors. These may require an explicit *concept of self*—something more cognitively complicated than the *feeling self*. Other factors include bodily maps of emotional feelings, stocks of emotion concepts, and objects of emotion.

Chapter 5 examines the ongoing debate over emotion’s natural kind status. Per the primitivist theory, emotion constitutes a natural kind under an essentialist construal: every instance of emotion boasts a definable essence (namely, feeling of bodily changes triggered during exteroception). However, individual emotions (anger, pride, embarrassment, etc.) do not: there are no nonarbitrary means of delineating one discrete emotion kind from another.