# Jordan C. V. Taylor

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Contact —	
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Phone	
Website	https://jordancvtaylor.com
Employme	nt ————
2018-	Faculty Lecturer, Critical Writing Program, University of Pennsylvania
Interests -	
AOS	Philosophy of Psychology; Philosophy of Science
AOC	Philosophy of Mind; History of Psychology; Early Modern Philosophy
	Additional teaching interests in Bioethics; Critical Writing
Education	
2012-18	PhD in Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania
	Dissertation: Actually Embodied Emotions
	See dissertation synopsis on page 5 Committee: Gary Hatfield (advisor), Karen Detlefsen, Lisa Miracchi, Michael Weisberg
2013–15	Certificate in Social, Cognitive, and Affective Neuroscience, University of Pennsylvania Supervisor: Martha Farah
2010–12	MPhil in Cognitive Science, Macquarie University  Dissertation: <i>Emotion across Three Phases: A theory of a dynamic emotion system</i> Committee: John Sutton (advisor), Nicolas Bullot (associate advisor)
2004-08	BA with First Class Honours in Philosophy, Australian Catholic University
Publication	ns —
Peer-reviewe	ed articles and book chapters
(6)	Hopkins, E. J., Weisberg, D. S., & <b>Taylor</b> , <b>J. C. V.</b> (2019). "Does expertise moderate the seductive allure of reductive explanations?" <i>Acta Psychologica</i> 198.
(5)	Weisberg, D. S., Hopkins, E. J., & <b>Taylor</b> , J. C. V. (2018). "People's explanatory preferences for scientific phenomena." <i>Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications</i> 3(44): 1–14.
(4)	Hopkins, E. J., Weisberg, D. S., & <b>Taylor</b> , <b>J. C. V</b> . (2016). "The seductive allure is a reductive allure: People prefer scientific explanations that contain logically irrelevant reductive information." <i>Cognition</i> 155: 67–76.
(3)	Hopkins, E. J., Weisberg, D. S., & <b>Taylor</b> , <b>J. C. V</b> . (2016). "Examining the specificity of the seductive allure effect." In <i>Proceedings of the 38<sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting of the Cognitive Science Society</i> , ed. A. Papafragou, D. Grodner, J. Trueswell, & D. Mirman. Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.
(2)	Weisberg, D. S., <b>Taylor, J. C. V.</b> , & Hopkins, E. J. (2015). "Deconstructing the seductive allure of neuroscience explanations." <i>Judgment and Decision Making</i> 10(5): 429–441.
(1)	<b>Taylor, J. C. V.</b> (2013). "Emotional Sensations and the Moral Imagination in Malebranche." In <i>The Discourse of Sensibility: The Knowing Body in the Enlightenment</i> , ed. H. M. Lloyd. Cham: Springer.
Articles und	er review
(1)	Taylor, J. C. V. (under review). "Solipsistic sentience and affective perception."

#### Invited book reviews

(4) Review of *The Passions of the Soul and Other Late Philosophical Writings* by R. Descartes, trans. M. Moriarty.

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2017, 25(6): 1242–1244.

(3) Review of *Emotion and Cognitive Life in Medieval and Early Modern Philosophy*, ed. M. Pickavé & L. Shapiro.

British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2013, 21(6): 1235–1237.

- (2) Review of Occasionalism: Causation Among the Cartesians by S. Nadler. British Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2012, 20(3): 627–630.
- (1) Review of *The Body as Object and Instrument of Knowledge*, ed. C. Wolfe & O. Gal. *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, 2011, 19(6): 1225–1227.

	Dittish journal for the History of Philosophy, 2011, 19(0). 1223-1227.	
Presentat	tions —	— † indicates invited
(12)	"What is a Jamesian emotion?"	
(12)	Oral presentation, <i>International Society for Research on Emotion (ISRE)</i> , St. Louis, MO.	July, 2017
	Poster presentation, Society for Affective Science (SAS), Boston, MA.	April, 2017
(11)	"Emotional primitivism and appraisal theory" † Oral presentation, <i>Representing Reality: A daylong conference on the philosophy of psychology</i> , State University of New York at Potsdam.	May, 2017
(10)	"On 'Seductive Allure of Neuroscience" † Oral presentation, Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience Retreat 2017, University of Pennsylvania.	February, 2017
(9)	"Actually embodied emotions"  Poster presentation, 42 <sup>nd</sup> Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SPP), The University of Texas at Austin.	June, 2016
(8)	"Does expertise moderate the seductive allure of reductive explanations?" Oral presentation, 42 <sup>nd</sup> Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SPP), The University of Texas at Austin. (With E. J. Hopkins & D. S. Weisberg.)	June, 2016
(7)	"Descartes on the heart, blood, and Harvey"  Oral presentation, <i>International Society for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology (ISHPSSB)</i> , Université de Québec à Montréal.	July, 2015
(6)	"Injecting concepts into Burgean perception"  Poster presentation, 40 <sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting of the Society for Philosophy and Psychology (SPP), University of British Columbia.  Oral presentation, 2014 Penn Spring Philosophy of Science Workshop,	June, 2014 May, 2014
	University of Pennsylvania.	
(5)	"On experiencing and categorising one's own emotion states" † Oral presentation, <i>Faculty of Human Sciences Higher Degree Research Showcase</i> , Macquarie University.	November, 2011
(4)	"Carruthers on pretence, emotions, and reading one's own mind: An exploration"  Oral presentation, Agent Tracking 2011: A Multidisciplinary Conference on Identification and Tracking of Human Individuals, Macquarie University.	June, 2011
(3)	"A cognitive model of the imagination and emotions"  Oral presentation, 15 <sup>th</sup> Annual Meeting for the Scientific Study of Consciousness (ASSC), Kyoto University.	June, 2011

Jordan C. V. Ta	Updated August, 2019	
(2)	"Emotional affect and the moral imagination in Malebranche" Oral presentation, <i>Inaugural Conference of the Centre for the History of Philosophy: Emotions in the History of Philosophy</i> , University of York. Oral presentation, <i>ACU Philosophy Seminar Series</i> , Australian Catholic University.	May, 2011 April, 2011
(1)	"Sensations, emotions, and imagination in Malebranche: Interdependency of mind and body"  Oral presentation, Sensibilité: The Knowing Body in the Enlightenment, spestream of Australian Society for Continental Philosophy Conference (ASCP). University of Queensland.	ecial December, 2010
Courses ta	ught (as primary instructor)	
University o	f Pennsylvania	
(11–12)	The Mind of a Dog	Fall, 2019 & Spring, 2020
(7–10)	The Art of Persuasion	Fall, 2019, Spring, 2020, Fall, 2018 & Spring, 2019
(5-6)	The Origins of Consciousness	Fall, 2018 & Spring, 2019
(3-4)	Music and the Brain	Fall, 2017 & Spring, 2018
(2)	Introduction to Philosophy	Summer, 2017
(1)	Cognition & Emotion	Spring, 2017
Courses ta	ught (as teaching assistant)	
University o	f Pennsylvania	
(13)	Early Modern Philosophy (instructor: Karen Detlefsen)	Spring, 2015
(12)	Biomedical Ethics (instructor: Andrew McAninch)	Fall, 2014
(11)	Visual Studies: Eye, Mind and Image (instructors: Michael Leja & Gary Hatfield)	Spring, 2014
(10)	Introduction to Philosophy (instructors: Gresham Riley & Pamela Riley)	Fall, 2013
University o	f Notre Dame, Australia	
(9)	Introduction to Philosophy and Ethics (instructors: Patrick Yong & Sandra Lynch)	Semester one, 2012
(8)	Introduction to Philosophy (instructor: Patrick Yong)	Semester two, 2011
(7)	Introduction to Ethics (instructor: Patrick Yong)	Semester one, 2011
Australian C	Catholic University	
(5, 6)	Theories of Human Nature (instructor: Stephen Buckle)	Semester one, 2009 & Semester one, 2012
(4)	Theories of Human Nature (instructor: John Quilter)	Semester one, 2011
(3)	Professional Ethics (instructor: Drago Heler)	Semester two, 2009
Macquarie U	University	
(2)	Mind, Meaning and Metaphysics (instructors: Robert Sinnerbrink, Cynthia Townley, and Jeanette Kennett)	Semester two, 2010
Hijiyama Uı	niversity	
(1)	Various courses in developmental and professional English	2005–2006

#### † indicates audited Graduate coursework Philosophy of Emotion Emotion, Motivation, and Control † Lisa Miracchi Adrienne Martin Contemporary Ethics: Contempt, Shame, and Disgust Philosophy of Mind & Psychology Mind in Life: Evolution and Perception Gary Hatfield Philosophy of Psychology Gary Hatfield **Epistemic Realisms** Gary Hatfield John Sutton Philosophical Issues in Cognitive Science (Macquarie University) Cognitive Science & Neuroscience Proseminar in Psychology: Cognitive Neuroscience Russell Epstein Foundations of Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience Martha Farah Special Topics in Social, Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience Martha Farah Mark Williams Issues in Brain Imaging (Macquarie University) Concepts & Object Recognition Gary Hatfield Cognitive Neuroscience Matthew Weber History of Philosophy Topics in Early Modern Philosophy: From Natural Philosophy to Modern Karen Detlefsen Medicine Critique of Pure Reason † Rolf Horstmann 17th Century Philosophy Karen Detlefsen Hellenistic Philosophy Susan Sauvé Meyer History of Analytic Philosophy Elisabeth Camp Other philosophy courses Philosophy of Physics Zoltan Domotor Scott Weinstein Formal Logic Errol Lord Metaethical Rationalism Grants & honors 2017 - 18Critical Writing Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania 2015-16 Nancy L. Blank Graduate Prize Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania 2014-15 George W. M. Bacon Fellowship, University of Pennsylvania 2012-17 Benjamin Franklin Fellowship, full research fellowship, University of Pennsylvania 2010-12 Australian Postgraduate Award, full research scholarship, Macquarie University 2011 Faculty of Human Sciences Higher Degree Research Excellence Award, Macquarie University 2005 Canon Australia Scholarship for Excellence in Japanese Studies, Australian Catholic University 2013-17 Travel Award x 4, University of Pennsylvania 2011 Travel Award, Centre for the History of Philosophy (CHiPhi)

Travel Award x 3, Macquarie University

2010-11

# Services to the profession

2018-	Senior tutor at the Marks Family Writing Center, University of Pennsylvania
2013-16	Volunteer research assistant in the Cognition & Development Lab at the Institute for Research in Cognitive Science (IRCS), University of Pennsylvania
2014-16	Graduate associate and student advisor at Harrison College House, University of Pennsylvania
2013-14	Visiting Associate of the Department of Cognitive Science, Macquarie University
2011	Co-convenor and head of graduate committee of Agent Tracking 2011: A Multidisciplinary Conference on the Identification and Tracking of Human Individuals, Macquarie University
2017-	Reviewer for Acta Psychologica; Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Science; Emotion Review

### References

Gary Hatfield, Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania
Karen Detlefsen, Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania
Lisa Miracchi, Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania
Michael Weisberg, Department of Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania
Deena Skolnick Weisberg, Department of Psychology, Villanova University
Martha Farah, Center for Neuroscience & Society, University of Pennsylvania

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## Dissertation synopsis

#### Actually Embodied Emotions

Emotions are familiar features of our lives. But despite our intimate relationship with them, we struggle to understand exactly what they are. In 1884, William James famously asks: "What is an emotion?"—a simple question, but a tricky one. Philosophy and the sciences of the mind have not yet agreed on its answer.

This dissertation explores the nature of emotion in human and non-human minds. It offers a *primitivist theory of emotion*: prototypically, an emotion is a bodily feeling caused by *interoceptive* monitoring of activity in sensory systems (*exteroceptors*) during registration of the organism's environment. An emotion is a specific kind of affective state whose intentional quality is directed at both the organism and its sensible environment.

The primitivist theory is Jamesian in spirit. In attempting to answer his own question, James proposed that emotions are bodily feelings. He also placed an embodied *feeling self* at the center of his theory. Emotions, as dynamic, ever-present feelings of the body, construct this feeling self. In building on these concepts, the primitivist theory stands as a plausible answer to James's question.

While most extant theories of emotion are *cognitivist* in nature, the primitivist theory is *noncognitivist*. Emotions need not be triggered by prior mental states. In fact, they can occur prior to any rich perceptual or cognitive processing. This allows for attribution of emotional experiences to a wide range of creatures, from cognitively sophisticated humans to organisms possessing rudimentary sensorimotor systems.

Actually Embodied Emotions has five chapters. Chapter 1 is an historical project: it examines James's theory of emotion within the context of his broader theory of psychology. It also assesses contemporary treatments of James. Two common misreadings lead commentators to either reject his theory or read it in a presentist manner, teasing out of it concepts developed in twentieth-century cognitive psychology. In analyzing these mistreatments, chapter 1 presents Jamesian theory as a conceptual resource for contemporary emotion researchers.

Chapter 2 examines attempts to revive and revise the Jamesian approach in light of scientific progresses. While such revivals should be celebrated, they also should respect James's theoretical commitments. Each of these "neo-Jamesian" theories neglects James's noncognitivism. However, a legitimate neo-Jamesian theory can account for emotions triggered independently of prior mental states.

Chapter 3 details the aforementioned primitivist theory of emotion. It draws from recent findings and theories throughout philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, and biology. It argues that emotional experiences contribute to perception. The contents of perceptual states involve *affordances*: we perceive objects via what we can do with or to them. Emotional feelings partly constitute affordances in representing the needs, concerns, and capabilities of the organism with respect to exteroceptive stimuli. An emotion thereby imports a self-interested affective quality to a perceptual state.

Chapter 4 focuses on human emotion episodes. It describes how we come to label our emotion episodes, and how they are influenced by social and cognitive factors. These may require an explicit *concept of self*—something more cognitively complicated than the *feeling self*. Other factors include bodily maps of emotional feelings, stocks of emotion concepts, and objects of emotion.

Chapter 5 examines the ongoing debate over emotion's natural kind status. Per the primitivist theory, emotion constitutes a natural kind under an essentialist construal: every instance of emotion boasts a definable essence (namely, feeling of bodily changes triggered during exteroception). However, individual emotions (anger, pride, embarrassment, etc.) do not: there are no nonarbitrary means of delineating one discrete emotion kind from another.